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University of Connecticut
This chapter explores the basic premise that family and medical 
leave consists of two separate analytical components: the wage 
replacement component and the job guarantee component. In legisla 
tion and in private businesses, these two components typically are dealt 
with separately. In the United States, for example, the Federal Family 
and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) provides job-guaranteed leave but no 
wage replacement. Canada has legislation that compels businesses to 
provide job guarantees during leave and legislation that grants wage 
replacement administered through the unemployment insurance sys 
tem. This dual system is also evident in the private practices of busi 
nesses where paid sick leave policies are separate from policies that 
deal with job guarantees.
The central hypothesis underlying this premise is that the factors 
that determine the provision of wage replacement during leave differ 
from the determinants of whether or not a job guarantee is provided. In 
general this hypothesis implies that differences exist in the factors that 
determine the provision of paid versus unpaid leave. It is specifically 
hypothesized that the determinants of paid leave are similar to those 
that account for other fringe benefits. Conversely, it is also hypothe 
sized that the provision of unpaid leave will not be as fully explained 
by the standard reduced form demand models specifying fringe benefit 
determination as will the provision of paid leave. Instead, it is conjec 
tured that the provision of unpaid leave can be explained by models 
that stress issues such as workplace efficiency, hours of work, and/or 
determinants of managerial control.
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These hypotheses are tested through a combination of empirical 
approaches that involve 1) an examination of the incidence of leave in 
the United States and Canada and 2) estimation of the determinants of 
the incidence of leave and the conditions surrounding leave. In investi 
gating the determinants of the incidence of leave among firms, we rely 
on a standard theoretical and empirical model of fringe benefit deter 
mination. This model consists of the estimation of a reduced form 
demand equation for fringe benefits with various proxy variables repre 
senting fringe benefit prices and other factors hypothesized to influ 
ence the incidence or levels of fringe benefits. Although this paper 
provides information on legislative mandates and information on the 
incidence of private sector policies for both Canada and the United 
States, the empirical analyses are limited to the United States and are 
based on data from the U.S. Small Business Administration Leave Sur 
vey. Overall, the findings presented below lend support to our central 
hypotheses that family and medical leave consists of two separate ana 
lytical components—a wage replacement component and a job guaran 
tee component.
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF FAMILY AND MEDICAL 
LEAVE IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES
Canada and the United States offer an opportunity to perform natu 
ral experiments in comparative social policies. The two countries 
claim common political, legal, cultural, and constitutional legacies; 
federal configurations; remarkably similar standards of living; and 
diverse societies. Both are advanced industrial countries with substan 
tial primary and manufacturing sectors and dominant rapidly growing 
service sectors. Most recently, the adoption of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement by both countries and the passage of the Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms (Bill of Rights) in Canada are bound to make 
the two countries more similar.
Important differences between Canada and the United States do 
exist, however, and may grow—the melting pot versus the mosaic as 
metaphor for society, universal health care in one country with no 
equivalent system in the other, and numerous other distinctions ranging
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from Arctic policy to the status of urban minorities. Furthermore, Can 
ada continues to endure a constitutional crisis while the United States 
faces serious racial tensions. In the area of family leave policies, Can 
ada and the United States share the basic problems of the changing 
nature of the modern workforce, the altering roles of women and men 
in the workplace, the changing contributions of men and women to the 
workforce, and the shifting needs of families and businesses to be com 
petitive in global markets (see Labour Canada, Women's Bureau 
[1990] for a summary of the position of women in the workforce in 
Canada).
Canada and the United States have a common, well-known post- 
World War II labor-force experience. In 1991, 53 percent of all Cana 
dian women aged 15 and over were employed while in the United 
States 57 percent of women aged 16 and over were working. In both 
Canada and the United States, half of all new mothers enter or reenter 
the labor force within one year of their baby's birth. Married women 
accounted for nearly all the growth in female employment during the 
past decade in both countries. The employment rate among married 
women in Canada grew from 47 percent in 1981 to 56 percent in 1991. 
In the United States, the employment rate among married women 
jumped from 48 percent to an identical 56 percent during the same 
period. While women have historically experienced slightly higher 
unemployment rates than men, the unemployment rates of women and 
men have converged in both countries during the past several years.
In spite of progress in both countries, most women continue to 
work in traditionally "female dominated occupations," such as teach 
ing, nursing or related health professions, clerical, sales, and services. 
Currently, however, women are entering "nontraditional" careers at 
rates over five times greater than 30 years ago. The number of two- 
career couples has increased by more than a factor of four in Canada 
since 1960 and by a similar amount in the United States. In the United 
States, more than 25 percent of all babies are now being born to single 
women. In Canada, where the number has risen rapidly during the 
past decade, the percentage is now 24.7 percent. The 1991 birth rate in 
Canada was 15.3 per 1,000, while the 1991 rate for the United States 
was 16.7 per 1,000. Birth rates have increased slightly in both coun 
tries during the past few years (Statistics Canada 1993; U.S. Depart 
ment of Commerce 1993).
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In Canada, family and medical leave and benefits are provided 
through a combination of government mandates, private policies, and 
union contracts. Wage replacement for medical, maternity, and paren 
tal leaves are provided under the Canadian Unemployment Insurance 
program. After 20 weeks of covered earnings in the year prior to a 
benefit application, a worker may claim 15 weeks of maternity bene 
fits, 10 weeks of parental benefits, and 15 weeks of sickness benefits up 
to a maximum of 30 weeks of benefits per occurrence. Unemployment 
insurance covers 57 percent of insurable earnings up to a maximum 
amount. This figure is adjusted annually to reflect living cost changes. 
The maximum earnings covered in 1993 was Can$745.00 per week, 
yielding a maximum weekly benefit of Can$425.00. In addition, many 
Canadian employees are covered either by paid sick leave or a supple 
mental unemployment benefit plan that can pay up to 95 percent of the 
employee's salary, including the unemployment insurance "clawback," 
which is designed to limit the liability of the unemployment insurance 
system to highly compensated employees. 1 Additional maternity leave 
policies are also provided by the private sector but, as noted in the fol 
lowing section, private policies are less extensive for maternity leave 
than they are for medical reasons.
In 1992, the Canadian Unemployment Insurance system covered 
10.933 million workers and had 1.148 million "regular beneficiaries." 
Approximately 235,000 workers received special benefits, such as 
sickness or maternity benefits. About 2.5 percent of the female labor 
force claims maternity benefits in a year, an amount equal to about 1 
percent of the labor force. Tables 1 and 2 describe the growth of public 
payments for sickness, maternity, adoption, and parental leave in Can 
ada. Real family-leave-type benefits have grown rapidly for the past 
decade and a half in Canada, keeping pace with the growth of real reg 
ular unemployment benefits. Canada has relatively low take-up rates 
for family-leave-type benefits. It is possible that the low Canadian 
rates are caused by individuals who do not meet eligibility require 
ments, by those who find the replacement rate too low to warrant filing 
for unemployment insurance, and by those who are unaware of the 
possibility of receiving benefits. Finally, it might be that many individ 
uals use vacation, sick, and other paid leave time during their period of 
family responsibility.
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Table 1 Canadian Unemployment Insurance: Nominal and Real Benefit 




























































































SOURCE: Labour Division, Unemployment Insurance Statistics Section, 1994
a Values in brackets represent real Canadian dollars (CPI=100 in 1986). Percent of regular
payment given in parentheses. 
b - Not available or less than 0.1%.
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Table 2 Canadian Unemployment Insurance
Number of Weeks Paid by Type of Benefit and Percentage 
























































SOURCE: Labour Division, Unemployment Insurance Statistics Section 1994. 
a Percent of regular benefit in parentheses. 
b - Not available or less than 0.1%.
Job guarantees in Canada are mandated in provincial and territorial 
legislation for most workers on maternity and parental leave. In gen 
eral, Canadian women on maternity leave are guaranteed the same or 
comparable employment upon their return to work, their seniority is 
protected, and their benefits are continued. Most jurisdictions (except 
Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Yukon) have parental leave that allows 
either parent from 12 to 34 weeks of job-guaranteed leave to care for a 
newborn or newly adopted child. (See Labour Canada, Women's 
Bureau [1993, 1988, 1984]; Maldonado and McDonald [1993]; Cana 
dian Union of Public Employees [1991]; and Schwartz [1988] for cur 
rent and historical summaries of leave legislation in Canada.) 
Canadian law does not, however, provide specific provisions for job 
guarantees surrounding medical leave. Instead, Canadians must rely 
on interpretations of labor law regarding whether a termination of an 
employee by an employer on account of illness is justifiable. In Can 
ada, a contract can be terminated as a result of "frustration when it has 
become impossible of performance because of a supervening event
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which is fortuitous and unforeseeable." In general, although there are 
certain exceptions, temporary incapacity by one of the parties does not 
result in frustration of the contract under Canadian law (Arthurs et al. 
1988).
Until 1993, leave in the United States was provided either at the 
discretion of the employer or mandated by state statute (for surveys of 
state leave statutes, see Finn-Stevenson & Trzcinski [1991] and the 
Women's Legal Defense Fund [1990]). With the exception of five 
states that provide temporary disability insurance, all wage replace 
ment during medical leave is provided through paid sick leave policies 
and private sickness and accident insurance. Paid leave for other fam 
ily reasons is largely unavailable. The Family and Medical Leave Act 
was signed into law in February 1993 and became effective in August 
1993. This legislation specifies that employees of companies with 50 
or more workers are entitled to 12 weeks of unpaid leave per year for 
childbirth, adoption, or to tend to the serious illness of a child, parent, 
spouse, or the employee himself.
The legislation guarantees the continuation of all fringe benefits 
(including health insurance). Upon return from leave, the employee 
must be provided with the same or equivalent job, and seniority rights 
must also be maintained. To be eligible, the employee must have 
worked at the company for at least one year and have worked a mini 
mum of 25 hours per week for that year. Under certain conditions, the 
company may deny leaves to "key employees," defined in the law as 
the highest paid 10 percent of its workforce. Finally, if the employer or 
the employee desires it, the person on leave must use accrued paid 
leave time for the leave in question. The law does not require, how 
ever, that the employer allow paid sick leave to be used for other condi 
tions covered under the law, such as parental leave or leave to care for 
sick children, spouses, or parents.
An important distinction, then, between the U.S. and Canadian 
cases is the general availability of paid maternity, parental, and medical 
leave through the unemployment insurance system in Canada. A sec 
ond major distinction between Canada and the United States is that 
Canadian workers have no mandated leave for family responsibilities 
other than parental leave for newborn children or newly adopted chil 
dren. Only Quebec mandates five days unpaid leave for family respon 
sibilities. Furthermore, it is also important to note that, in exempting
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companies with fewer than 50 employees, the Family and Medical 
Leave Act eliminates 95 percent of all U.S. firms as well as 61 percent 
of the workforce from the force of law (U.S. General Accounting 
Office 1989). Thus, while a mandate exists in the U.S. case, fewer than 
half of all U.S. workers are affected by it.
PROVISION OF LEAVE IN CANADA AND THE UNITED 
STATES: A DESCRIPTIVE TREATMENT
For the U.S. analysis, we use data from the U.S. Small Business 
Administration Employee Leave Survey commissioned in 1988 to 
answer several major questions facing policy makers with respect to 
mandated leave. An important aspect of the survey was the collection 
of data on the leave policies of U.S. businesses in a nationally repre 
sentative sample of firms. The survey instrument for the Small Busi 
ness Administration's (SBA's) Employee Leave Survey was a four- 
page questionnaire forwarded to 10,000 business executives. The 
questionnaire requested information concerning company policies on 
paid sick leave, sickness and accident insurance, vacation leave, unpaid 
leave, leave to care for sick children and ailing parents, and the han 
dling of work during leaves. It also contained questions on costs of 
leaves and terminations to the firms, the benefits accruing to part-time 
employees, and the firm's characteristics. The survey included an 
instruction sheet that asked respondents to indicate whether they were 
the only worker in their company or if the company employed only 
members of the owners immediate family. In cases in which the firm 
employed family members only, the respondent was requested to 
return the blank questionnaire and the instruction sheet with an indica 
tion that the firm employed only family members.
A random sample of 10,000 firms was obtained from the SBA's 
Small Business Data Base (SBDB). The SBDB is a data file covering 
some 3.8 million businesses (enterprises) with almost 5 million estab 
lishments, representing 93 percent of private employment in the United 
States. The file mainly consists of firms that have paid employees and 
that have entered formal credit markets. It generally excludes partner 
ships, sole proprietorships with no paid employees, and wage and sal-
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ary workers who maintain secondary businesses. The SBDB is 
primarily drawn from Dun and Bradstreet's Small Business and Mil 
lion Dollar Directory Files. The SBDB used in this study had been last 
updated prior to this survey in 1986.
The SBA Employee Leave Survey was mailed in November and 
December of 1988. To encourage responses, the questionnaire was 
mailed to each potential respondent twice, approximately three weeks 
apart. Each mailing contained a different cover letter from the SBA 
underscoring the importance of the survey and urging the recipient to 
respond to the questionnaire. A first-class return postage paid envelope 
was included with each mailing to encourage responses.
Responses were received from 2,732 of the 10,000 firms for an 
apparent overall response rate of approximately 27 percent. However, 
some 2,551 of the surveys from both mailings were nondeliverable, 
suggesting that about 1,275 of the mailed questionnaires should not be 
counted as part of the 10,000 firm sample. If we discount the nondeliv 
erable questionnaires, the sample size shrinks to 8,725 and the 
response rate increases to 31.3 percent. Further details on the survey 
design, the sample, and an analysis of nonresponse bias are presented 
in Trzcinski and Alpert (1990).
Policies in the United States
This section presents findings from the SBA survey on the inci 
dence of leave as well as on benefits and guarantees surrounding 
leaves. Findings concerning leave for family responsibilities are also 
presented. Although the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Employee 
Benefits surveys provide information on the incidence of paid sick 
leave, sickness and accident insurance, and maternity and paternity 
leave, the SBA survey remains the only national survey that collected 
information on the incidence of unpaid medical leave and on the condi 
tions surrounding leave, such as health benefit continuation, seniority 
protection, and job guarantees.
Incidence of Leave. Table 3 presents the incidence of leave poli 
cies by firm size and differentiates among the separate categories of 
leave. Table 3 shows that, for businesses in the SBA survey, the inci 
dence of paid sick leave increased as firm size increased. In companies
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SOURCE: Trzcinski and Alpert 1990.
a Firm size is determined by number of employees.
with 1-15 employees, 31.5 percent provided paid sick leave. This per 
centage increased to 48.5 percent for firms with 16-49 employees and 
to 61.8 percent for firms with 50-99 employees. In firms with 100 or 
more employees, 75 percent provided job-guaranteed paid sick leave. 
Regardless of firm size, firms were more likely to offer unpaid leave 
than paid leave. Only 9.8 percent of the largest firms did not allow 
employees to take unpaid leave for sickness. The percentage rose to 
25.9 in the smallest firms.
Table 3 also shows the percentage of firms that both provided vaca 
tion and allowed vacation days to be used for sickness. Firms some 
times place restrictions on the use of vacation because the firms want to 
maintain control over scheduling or are acting paternalistically. More 
than 50 percent of all firms allowed employees access to paid leave for 
sickness through reallocation of vacation days. The percentage of 
firms either not providing vacation or not allowing the use of vacation 
days for sickness ranged from 40.1 percent in the smallest firms to 11.5 
percent in firms with 50-99 employees.
The 1978 U.S. Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) stipulates that 
employers who provide sickness or disability leave must also extend 
this leave to women for pregnancy and childbirth-related disabilities.
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Thus, prior to the enactment of the FMLA, paid sick leave, short-term 
temporary disability policies, and unpaid sick leave policies repre 
sented the major source of leave available for pregnancy and child 
birth-related disabilities. In 1987, the Supreme Court ruled in 
California Federal v. Guerra that separate maternity leave policies do 
not violate the Civil Rights Act. Hence, firms may legally supplement 
existing sick leave policies or implement sick leave policies that apply 
exclusively to pregnancy and childbirth-related disabilities. The per 
centage of firms implementing such policies range from 6.1 in the 
smallest firms to 22.8 in the largest firms (Table 3). The percentages of 
business reporting separate maternity leave policies in the U.S. Small 
Business Administration survey were lower than the percentages 
reporting such policies in Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Employee 
Benefits surveys, where the percentages reporting unpaid maternity 
leave range from 17 percent in small establishments to 37 percent in 
large establishments (U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Sta 
tistics 1991). The differences between the two surveys occur because 
unpaid maternity leave that covers disabilities, but not care for new 
born children, was usually reported under unpaid medical leave in the 
SBA survey. Under EEOC guidelines, maternity leave for care-giving 
purposes cannot be granted to women without equivalent leave also 
being granted to men (U.S. EEOC 1990). The BLS survey found that 
the incidence of unpaid paternity leave ranges from 8 percent in small 
establishments to 18 percent in large ones. The higher rate of mater 
nity leave as compared with paternity leave in the BLS surveys results 
from the inclusion of unpaid leave for disabilities resulting from preg 
nancy and childbirth in the maternity leave percentages as maternity, 
but not paternity, leaves.
Benefits and Guarantees during Leave. All the enacted state and 
federal legislation provide for unpaid leave. Thus, given the relatively 
high incidence of unpaid leave policies in large firms and legislative 
exemptions for small firms, the primary role of current legislative initi 
atives centers on providing uniformity and certainty in leave policy to 
employees in firms employing 50 or more. A critical aspect of any 
leave legislation or firm-specific leave policy concerns how the law or 
firm policy deals with the conditions under which the employee may
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return to work. Three major questions answered in the FMLA and in 
firm-specific policy are as follows:
1) Upon returning from a leave for illness, disability, pregnancy, 
or childbirth, are employees guaranteed the same or a 
comparable job?
2) Are employees guaranteed seniority for promotion and other 
purposes during the leave?
3) Does the employer continue to pay the employer share of 
health benefits during the leave?
Information concerning guarantees and benefits during leave are 
presented in Table 4. In general, the data indicate that, with the excep 
tion of unpaid sick leave and maternity leave for firms employing 
between 50 and 99 workers, the incidence of all forms of leave with 
health insurance continuation and job and seniority guarantees 
increases with firm size. The incidence of unpaid sick leave and mater 
nity leave (and attendant guarantees and health insurance continuation) 
in firms employing between 50 and 99 workers usually is slightly 
higher than it is in the largest firms. This may simply be an anomaly in 
this data or it might indicate that economies of scale for these benefits 
cease at a firm size of approximately 50-99 workers. The data might 
also be reflecting state-level legislation mandating that such leaves be 
provided by firms employing in excess of 50 people.
Between 19 and 25 percent of all firms in the smallest firm size 
category (1-15 employees) provide paid sick leave with seniority and 
job guarantees and health insurance continuation for both managers 
and nonmanagers (Table 4). Similarly, for both occupation groups, 
approximately 40 percent of small firms provide unpaid sick leave with 
a job guarantee, between 30 and 32 percent with a seniority guarantee, 
and about a quarter continue to pay health insurance during sick leave. 
Less than 5 percent of all firms in this category provide any job, senior 
ity, or health insurance continuation benefits while an employee is on a 
maternity leave.
In the two largest firm size categories for both managers and non- 
managers, the percentage of firms providing paid sick leave with a job 
guarantee increases to about 60 percent, but paid sick leave with 
seniority guarantees is provided by only about 45 percent of the firms. 
The same pattern is followed with both unpaid sick leave (61-70 per-
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Table 4 Leaves with Benefits and Guarantees in U.S. Firms: Incidence by 























































































































SOURCE- Trzcmski and Alpert 1990. 
a Firm size determined by number of employees
142 Trzcinski and Alpert
cent of firms providing this benefit with a job guarantee and 44-53 per 
cent providing such leave with a seniority guarantee) and separate 
maternity leave (15-20 percent providing separate maternity leave with 
a job guarantee but only about 11-13 percent providing seniority guar 
antees). The proportion of firms with 50-99 employees providing 
health insurance continuation is smaller than the proportion providing 
job guarantees for each of the benefits listed in Table 4 but the propor 
tion is larger for seniority guarantees. While in the largest firm size 
category, however, the percentage of firms providing seniority guaran 
tees is generally larger in each benefit category than the percentage 
offering to pay for health insurance during an employee leave.
The data in Table 4 reveal a substantial percentage of the busi 
nesses that provided leave did so without providing a job guarantee and 
without providing for health benefit continuation. The major exception 
is separate maternity leave policies, where the incidence of leave with 
job guarantees quite closely matched the overall incidence of leave. 
Thus, prior to the enactment of the Family and Medical Leave Act, a 
substantial minority of firms provided neither health insurance contin 
uation nor job or seniority guarantees with leave. While approximately 
90 percent of businesses with 50-99 and with 100 or more employees 
provided either formal or informal unpaid medical leave, a substantial 
percentage of these businesses provided neither a job guarantee nor 
health benefit continuation.
The same basic picture is presented in Table 5, where a tabulation 
of the SBA survey results for questions concerning leave to care for 
sick children and ailing parents is presented. Specifically, the survey 
requested employers to note whether paid sick leave, vacation time, or 
any other leave could be used by managerial or nonmanagerial 
employees to care for their infirm children or parents. The question 
was phrased so that it is not known whether such leave is discretionary 
or whether it contains job guarantees.
As in the case of other leaves, the data in Table 5 show that, as firm 
size increases, the percentage of firms allowing workers to use various 
kinds of leave to care for sick children also increases. With the notable 
exception of the other leave category (in which case employers' per 
mission for use of other leave to care for sick children increases mono- 
tonically with our firm size groupings from about 6 or 7 percent in the 
smallest firm size category to about 32 percent in the largest), employ-
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Table 5 Leave to Care for Sick Children and Leave to Care
for Ailing Parents in U.S. Firms, Incidence by Type of Leave 
and Firm Size (%)a
Firm sizeb













































































SOURCE: Trzcinski and Alpert 1990. 


































and without job guarantees. 
b Firm size determined by number of employees.
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ers' permission for their employees to use either sick or vacation leaves 
for sick child care increases with firm size, usually reaching its maxi 
mum in the category of between 50 and 99 employees. Between 45 
percent (nonmanagers) and 48 percent (managers) of all employers in 
this category allow sick leave to be used to care for sick offspring and 
80 percent (nonmanagers) and 81 percent (managers) allow their 
employees to use vacation to care for sick children.
Permission to use any form of leave for the care of ailing children 
is granted about half the time in the smallest firm size category 
(approximately 48 percent for managers and 51 percent for nonman 
agers) increasing (monotonically) to almost 90 percent (88 percent for 
managers and 87 percent for nonmanagers) in the largest firm size cat 
egory.
The results for ailing parents are extremely close to those for sick 
children. Between 45 percent (managers) and 50 percent (nonman 
agers) of employers in small firms (1-15 employees) allow their 
employees to use sick, vacation, or other leave to care for ailing par 
ents. This percentage increases monotonically until, in the largest firm 
size category, approximately 86 percent of employers allow their man 
agers to use sick vacation or other leave to care for infirm parents.
In summary, permission to use other leaves to care for sick chil 
dren and ailing parents were approximately equally available for man 
agers and nonmanagers. The granting of permission to use sick, 
vacation, and/or other leaves to care for ill children or parents is quite 
common, ranging from 50 percent of employers in the smallest firm 
size category to almost 90 percent in the largest. Firms most readily 
allowed the use of vacation leave for the care of sick children or infirm 
parents. Even in the smallest firm size category, between 40 and 45 
percent of the employers surveyed allowed the use of vacation leave 
for this purpose. This is understandable because vacation leave is one 
of the most flexible benefits provided by employers. Ideally, an 
employer would like an employee to take the vacation to "recharge" 
him- or herself and to be more efficient upon return to work. However, 
it appears that firms recognize that they will have little control over 
how vacations are actually used by employees and that any attempt to 
monitor and control vacation use will almost certainly be counterpro 
ductive.
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Private Sector Policies in Canada
Table 6, which provides results from an employer survey con 
ducted by the Pay Research Bureau (1988), shows that the types of 
benefits provided in Canada mirror those provided in the United States. 
The incidence of paid sick leave is high in Canada among managerial 
and professional workers, while it is relatively low among non-office 
workers. On the other hand, sickness indemnity insurance coverage 
rate is lower among managerial and professional workers but is much 
higher among non-office personnel. For virtually all covered workers 
(non-office workers having the highest coverage rate at over 40 per 
cent), employers pay all of the costs of sickness indemnity plans.
Most firms provide personal and parental leave; however, its length 
and the conditions under which it is granted vary greatly. Likewise, 
paid leave for an illness in the family is provided by about half of all 
employers of white-collar workers, but much of this leave is discretion 
ary—that is, granted at the discretion of the employer. Most non-office 
workers do not have access to paid leave for family illness.
Table 6 Incidence of Medical and Family-Related Benefits in Canada 
(% employees covered)
Management/ 
Benefit professional Office Nonoffice
Supplementary health 
insurance
Formal paid sick leave plans
Sickness indemnity plans
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SOURCE: Pay Research Bureau 1988.
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The duration of paid maternity leave varies greatly in Canada, 
from one day to 18 weeks (Pay Research Bureau 1988). Employers are 
permitted to supplement unemployment insurance through formalized 
supplemental unemployment benefit plans. Among management and 
professional workers, 33.7 percent are covered by such plans. Among 
office workers, the percentage falls to 25.4 percent; for non-office 
workers, the percentage covered is only 14.6 percent. For management 
and professional workers, 3.3 percent of employees receive such leave 
through a discretionary plan. For office workers, the proportion of 
workers eligible for such plans is 4 percent. Among non-office work 
ers, the percentage falls to 2.5 percent. Such plans can make up the 
difference between an employee's unemployment benefit and their sal 
ary, up to a maximum of 95 percent of the employee's regular salary 
(Pay Research Bureau 1988).
MODELING THE INCIDENCE OF LEAVE AND CONDITIONS 
SURROUNDING LEAVE
Theoretical Considerations
Using the data from the U.S. Small Business Administration Leave 
Survey, we estimate two sets of models: the first deals with leave inci 
dence and the second with benefits and guarantees available for leave 
takers.
The model used to examine the provision of paid and unpaid leave 
is conventional since we hypothesize that leave is provided as a result 
of the interaction of employer supply and employee demand. The SBA 
survey was designed to address the question of what factors influence 
the incidence of leave and conditions surrounding leave. Specific 
questions were included in the questionnaire to measure important sup 
ply- and demand-side factors that theoretically influence whether or 
not leave is provided.
Fringe benefit supply varies in response to differences in relative 
costs of benefit provision (Rice 1966; Alpert 1982; Woodbury 1983; 
Vroman and Anderson 1984; and Even 1992). The supply of fringe 
benefits is hypothesized to vary with their costs to the firm. A principal
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determinate of cost is thought to be the size of the firm because fringe 
benefit provision is thought to be subject to economies of scale of 
group purchase. Measures of firm size are usually utilized to act as 
proxy variables for these economies of scale. We use several variables 
to proxy for such economies, including number of employees, sales 
volume, and type of firm ownership.
We also hypothesize that, in industries in which larger firms pre 
dominate, leaves will be provided more frequently as a result of com 
petition (for comparable compensation packages), follow-the-leader 
relationships, and demonstration and/or learning effects among the 
firms in such industries. In order to proxy these effects, we include in 
our analysis a variable (Percentage Small in the Industry) that captures 
the percentage of small firms in the industry in which the firm does 
business. This variable measures the percentage of firms in the indus 
try employing fewer than 100 workers. Unpublished data from the 
SBA was used to construct this variable.
The model also contains several demand-side variables. Recogniz 
ing that unionized workers often either demand larger quantities of 
fringe benefits or can express their demand for more fringe benefits 
through their union better than nonunionized workers, we include a 
variable equaling one if a majority of the firm's workforce is unionized 
and zero otherwise. We also include a variable reflecting the percent 
age of workers in the firm's industry who are unionized (reflecting the 
possibility of spillover effects of unionization on other union and non 
union firms in the industry). It is important to recognize that such 
spillover effects might operate in either direction since a heavily union 
ized industry would be an industry in which, all else constant, workers' 
tastes are better communicated to employers. If workers overall prefer 
other forms of compensation (for example, cash wages) to leave and 
insurance, a high rate of unionization might actually lower the likeli 
hood that workers in a particular firm have such benefits (holding con 
stant unionization in that firm). Conversely, if workers overall prefer 
leave and insurance to other forms of compensation, high rates of 
industry unionization could raise the likelihood that workers in a par 
ticular firm have such benefits.
In addition, workers' tastes (and hence their demand) for fringe 
benefits are likely to vary with certain demographic characteristics. 
Here, we hypothesize that tastes for leave can be proxied by the gender
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and age of a firm's workforce. We use a variable measuring the per 
centage of the firm's workforce that is female of childbearing age (16- 
44 years old) and the percentage of the firm's workforce that is over the 
age of 55 to measure two subgroups of workers more likely to demand 
leave than are other groups. Testing the hypothesis that women work 
ers prefer leave and insurance-type benefits to other forms of compen 
sation, we include a variable reflecting the percentage of female 
workers in the industry in our estimating equations. Finally, we con 
trol for the unemployment rate (at the time of the survey) in the state in 
which the firm is located, the percentage of the state's workforce 
located in rural areas, and several industry categorical variables to cap 
ture industry effects. An important variable omitted from the equations 
is worker income. Other variables, such as firm size and age, will act 
as proxies for income, but readers should be aware of the bias created 
in the estimated coefficients by the omission of a variable that directly 
measures worker income.
The following sections present bivariate logit estimates (and OLS 
equivalent coefficients) of the incidence of paid and unpaid medical 
leave and the incidence of different types of family leave.
Incidence of Medical Leave
Table 7 displays estimates of logit regressions in which employer 
provision of some types of medical leave are regressed on a variety of 
independent variables, including three measures of scale of firm: num 
ber of employees, sales volume, and ownership type. Across the differ 
ent firm size measures, smaller firms are generally significantly less 
likely than larger firms to provide medical leave. For paid sick leave 
only and combined paid sick leave and sickness and accident insur 
ance, firms with 15 or fewer employees are significantly less likely to 
provide these benefits than firms employing 100 or more workers. 
Thus, there appears to be a threshold effect for paid leave, with the 
threshold occurring at the smallest firm size category. It is interesting 
to note that no such effect is apparent for sickness and accident insur 
ance. For formal unpaid leave, the effect suggested in the two-way 
analysis continues to be present. Each included firm size category 
variable's coefficient shows that firms within that firm size category are 
significantly less likely to provide this benefit than firms employing
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Table 7 Logit Estimates of the Probability that a Firm Provides 
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Variable15
Percent female age 16-^44,
nonmanagers
Percent female in industry
Percent age 55 or more,
Manager
Percent age 55 or more,
nonmanager
State unemployment rate











































































































1 Original logit coefficient given in brackets and standard error of the original logit coeffi 
cient in parentheses.
b Excluded categories of categorical variables include: 100 or more employees, sales vol 
ume greater than $50 million annually, Subchapter S Corporations (ownership type), ser 
vices (industry), and nonunion workers.
***sigmficant at the 1% level (two-tailed test). 
**sigmficant at the 5% level (two-tailed test). 
*significant at the 10% level (two-tailed test).
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100 or more workers, and the likelihood that a business provides 
unpaid leave increases steadily as the number of the firm's employees 
increases.
These scale effects are quite small, however. The OLS equivalent 
coefficients of all forms of paid leave show that a 10 percent decrease 
in the size of the firm decreases the odds that a firm will offer leave by 
1 or 2 percent. However, in the case of unpaid leave, a decrease in firm 
size decreases the odds that the firm will offer leave substantially. For 
example, as the size of the firm falls below 100 employees, a 10 per 
cent reduction in firm size lowers the likelihood that a firm will provide 
unpaid leave by about 8.4 percent.
For both paid and unpaid leave, increases in sales volume also pos 
itively affect the likelihood that businesses provide leave. For paid 
leave, this effect is consistent across three of the sales volume catego 
ries and is not limited to the type of threshold effect observed for a 
number of employees. In the case of paid sick leave, all four sales vol 
ume categorical variables have significant and negative effects relative 
to the excluded category, sales volume equal to or exceeding $50 mil 
lion. In this case, the lower the sales volume, the greater the negative 
effect on the incidence of leave relative to the excluded sales size cate 
gory. For example in firms with annual sales volumes of less than 
$250,000 a 10 percent reduction in sales volume will result in a 3 per 
cent reduction in the likelihood of paid leave, while in a firm with sales 
volume between $10 and $50 million, a 10 percent reduction in sales 
volume will yield a 1.6 percent lowered probability of paid sick leave 
provision. In the estimate of combined paid sick leave/sickness and 
accident insurance, the significant effects hold for the three lowest 
sales volume categories, while for unpaid leave, only the two lowest 
sales volume categories show significantly lower incidences of leave 
compared with businesses with higher sales volumes. Ownership type 
also affects the incidence of paid leave but not unpaid leave. Sole pro 
prietorships and partnerships tend to be less likely to provide leaves 
than are corporations and Subchapter S Corporations. This effect is 
relatively large with the OLS equivalent coefficient in the paid leave 
equation equaling -0.66.
The variable, Percentage Small in the Industry, has significant and 
negative coefficients in Table 7 in the paid medical leave and combined 
paid sick leave and sickness and accident insurance equations, but it
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has no statistically significant effect in the unpaid medical leave equa 
tion.
The five dummy variables included to control for industry are agri 
culture, mining, and construction; manufacturing; transportation; 
wholesale trade; and retail trade. The excluded category is the service 
sector. Industry effects are limited to paid leave and sickness and acci 
dent insurance. There are large and significant differences between 
service and manufacturing firms in the provision of paid sick leave and 
sickness and accident insurance. In these cases, the OLS equivalent 
coefficients are -0.66 and +1.18. Firms in agriculture and in retail 
trade are less likely to provide paid sick leave than are firms in the ser 
vice sector. Firms in transportation are more likely than service sector 
firms to offer sickness and accident insurance, but this difference is not 
observable in the joint variable of paid sick leave and/or sickness and 
accident insurance. No statistically significant industry effects are 
observed in the unpaid leave equation.
A firm-specific variable and an industry-specific variable are 
included in the equation to measure the effects of unionization. These 
two unionization variable coefficients indicate that unions tend to 
affect the provision of leave and insurance in opposite directions. 
Firms whose workers are covered by a union contract are significantly 
more likely to provide sickness and accident insurance compared with 
firms whose workers are not unionized, but this variable has no effect 
on the joint provision of paid leave policies (Table 7). The findings 
also indicate that a spillover effect may be occurring. The percentage 
of workers unionized in the industry depresses the likelihood that a 
particular firm in that industry provides sickness and accident insur 
ance. As noted above, this result is plausible since, in spite of the fact 
that unionized workers are able to raise the level of a particular benefit 
in a given firm (industry unionization rate constant), it is also possible 
that even though unionization in a particular firm may raise the likeli 
hood of the presence of leave and/or insurance-type benefits in that 
firm, a high rate of unionization in an industry (reflecting overall 
worker preferences in that industry) may lower the likelihood that a 
particular firm in that industry offers leave and/or insurance-type bene 
fits. The latter result applies in this case for sickness and accident 
insurance. Neither the firm-specific nor the industry-specific union
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coefficient achieves statistical significance in the unpaid leave equa 
tion.
The firm level demographic variables (percent female aged 16-44 
and percent aged 55 or more) are entered separately in the equation for 
both managers and nonmanagers. The empirical analyses suggest that 
firm-specific and industry-specific demographic variables operate on 
two separate and conflicting levels where the negative effects of per 
cent female in the industry are counterbalanced by the effects of the 
firm-specific demographics. More specifically, the two variables, per 
cent female of the firm's managerial and nonmanagerial workforce 
aged 16-44, exert positive effects on the incidence of paid sick leave. 
This effect carries over to the combined incidence of paid sick leave 
days and sickness and accident insurance. In the unpaid leave equa 
tion, no effects are observed for the firm-specific measures of percent 
female, but the negative industry-specific effect remains. Although 
both coefficients of the variables percent female of the managerial and 
nonmanagerial workforce achieved statistical significance, the effects 
of firm-specific demographics concerning older workers are limited to 
effects stemming from the percent of older managers. In no case does 
the percent of the firm's nonmanagerial workforce aged 55 or older 
exert a statistically significant positive effect on the dependent variable. 
The percent of the firm's managerial workforce, aged 55 or older 
affects the likelihood of paid leave in the incidence equations, but it 
exerts no effect on incidence of unpaid leave.
As the state unemployment rate increases, the likelihood that a 
firm offers sickness and accident insurance significantly declines, as 
does the likelihood of the firm offering either paid sick leave days and/ 
or sickness and accident insurance. These effects are large. For exam 
ple, a 1 percent increase in the state unemployment rate reduces the 
likelihood that a firm will offer sickness and accident insurance by 2.35 
percent. No statistically significant effect of the state unemployment 
rate is observed in the unpaid leave equation.
The final control variable in this analysis is the percentage of the 
state's population that resides in a rural area. Here, the only significant 
effect occurs for the provision of formal unpaid medical leave policies: 
the greater this percentage, the less likely is a firm to have a formal, 
unpaid leave policy.
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Table 7 indicates that, although the unpaid leave equation does 
achieve statistical significance, the overall explanatory power as mea 
sured by chi-square is far below the level achieved by the paid leave 
equation. Several variables that consistently achieved significance in 
the paid leave equations do not to achieve significance in the unpaid 
leave equation, including ownership type, industry type, unionization 
(firm specific and industry), percent managers aged 55 or older, and 
state unemployment rate. As we noted at the beginning of this paper, 
we expected that a reduced form demand framework would better 
explain the provision of paid leave and insurance-type benefits than 
unpaid leave. From the results presented in Table 7, this appears to be 
the case.
Incidence of Family Leave
Table 8 presents logit estimates for four types of family leave: 
maternity leave (separate policy for disability and infant care), mater 
nity leave (separate policy for infant care only), leave to care for sick 
children, and leave to care for ailing parents. In the latter two cases, 
the existence of such leave typically indicates that the firm permits the 
use of other types of leave for caring for sick children and/or ailing par 
ents.
Only two coefficients of the categorical variables for economies of 
scale of group purchase are statistically significant at conventional lev 
els in Table 8. Thus, only in the smallest firm size category do signifi 
cantly fewer firms offer their workers maternity leave (either with 
disability and infant care or infant care only). In this set of four equa 
tions, two coefficients of the dummy variables for number of employ 
ees attain statistical significance. Firms employing 1-15 workers are 
less likely than other firms to have either separate maternity leave for 
disability and/or infant care. In no case does number of employees 
affect the likelihood that a firm provides leave to care for sick children 
or ailing parents. Sales volume, on the other hand, significantly affects 
the probability that a firm provides leave to care for ailing parents only 
in the smallest sales volume category. Sales volume has more perva 
sive effects on the provision of leave to care for sick children than it 
does for ailing parents, with the coefficient of the sick children variable 
achieving statistical significance in the smallest three sales size catego-
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Table 8 Logit Estimates of the Probability that a Firm Provides Separate 
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a Original logit coefficient in brackets and standard error of original logit coefficient in 
parentheses.
Excluded categories of categorical variables include: 100 or more employees, sales vol 
ume greater than $50 million annually, Subchapter S Corporations (ownership type), ser 
vices (industry), and nonunion workers
***sigmficant at the 1% level (two-tailed test). 
**sigmficant at the 5% level (two-tailed test) 
*significant at the 10% level (two-tailed test).
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ries. The statistically significant effects of ownership type also vary 
across the four equations. Corporations are more likely than other 
types of firms to provide separate maternity leave policies for infant 
care only, while sole proprietorships are less likely than other firms to 
provide separate parental leave policies and policies to care for sick 
children and ailing parents. As the percentage of small firms in the 
industry increases, the likelihood that a firm offers these same three 
types of leave also decreases significantly. Significant industry effects 
are more pronounced for leave to care for sick children and ailing par 
ents, with firms in agriculture, manufacturing, and retail trade less 
likely to provide these policies than firms in the service industry.
Neither of the coefficients of the unionization variables achieve 
statistical significance in any of the four cases examined here. In con 
trast to the effect of the percent female in the industry variable on med 
ical leave, the percent female in the industry variable exerts no effect 
on the incidence of different types of family leave. However, the likeli 
hood that a firm provides leave to care for sick children and for ailing 
parents increases significantly as the variable percent female aged 16- 
44 increases for both the managerial and nonmanagerial workforce. 
These effects are quite small, however. The OLS equivalent coeffi 
cients indicate that a 10 percent increase in any of these variables will 
lead to about a 1 percent increase in the likelihood that the firm in 
question will provide leave to care for sick children or ailing parents. 
The percent female, aged 16-44 of nonmanagers variable (but not the 
percent of managers variable), also affects the provision of separate 
policies for maternity leave. The percent of the firm's managerial 
workforce aged 55 or more has statistically significant effects on the 
incidence of leave to care for ailing parents.
In contrast to its negative effect on the provision of unpaid medical 
leave, the percent of the state population that resides in rural areas vari 
able shows a positive and significant relationship to the incidence of 
separate maternity leave policies for infant care only. The state unem 
ployment rate has no significant effects in any of the equations.
Many of the predictions of the model are demonstrated to be accu 
rate. The results in Table 8 show that limited economies of scale of 
group purchase exist for maternity leave for firms with more than 15 
employees, but no scale effects (as measured by numbers of employ 
ees) are present in the provision of leaves to care for sick children or
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ailing parents. Firms with less than $10 million in annual sales are sig 
nificantly less likely to provide leave to care for sick children than are 
firms with annual sales in excess of $50 million and very small firms 
(annual sales of less than $250,000) are significantly less likely to pro 
vide leave to care for ailing parents than are firms in the largest firm 
category. Few industry effects exist for these benefits; however, in gen 
eral, there is a significantly lower incidence of leave to care for sick 
children in all industries (except transportation and wholesale trade) 
than in services. Similarly, leave to care for sick children and ailing 
parents is significantly positively related to the percent of females 
(both managers and nonmanagers) variables. Only in the case of the 
leave to care for ailing parents equation does the percent of the firm's 
managerial workforce aged 55 or more have statistically significant 
effects. Thus, the most important determinants of maternity leave and 
leave to care for sick children and ailing parents are scale of firm (as 
measured by annual sales) and the percentage of small firms in the 
firm's industry. In the case of the latter variable, several industry 
effects and the percentage of managerial and nonmanagerial female 
employees between the ages of 16 and 44 are also important. The only 
other coefficient achieving statistical significance in any equation is 
that the larger the percent of a state's population that resides in rural 
areas the more maternity leave for infant care is provided.
Benefits and Guarantees Surrounding Medical Leave
Since most large firms provide both paid and unpaid medical leave, 
the major impact of the FMLA and state leave legislation centers on 
the mandating of conditions surrounding leave. As Table 4 indicates, a 
substantial percentage of firms, including large firms, provide leave 
without providing health benefit continuation or job guarantees. 
Although the lack of a job guarantee does not necessarily imply that an 
employee will be terminated, analysis of the SBA survey concerning 
terminations in businesses with and without job guarantees did find a 
significantly higher rate of terminations on account of illness and dis 
ability in businesses without job guarantees in their plans as compared 
to businesses with such job guarantees. Conversely, the analysis also 
found a correspondingly higher rate of leave-taking in businesses with
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job guarantees than in businesses without job guarantees (Trzcinski 
1994).
We provide multinomial logit estimates of the incidence of paid 
and unpaid leave with and without health benefit continuation (Tables 
9 and 10) and with and without job guarantees (Tables 11 and 12). The 
equations are estimated separately for managers (Tables 9 and 11) and 
nonmanagers (Tables 10 and 12).
In general, we hypothesize that the same variables that have signif 
icant effects in Table 7 for paid medical leave also have significant 
effects in Tables 9-12. Minor variations may occur, however, because 
a firm was designated as having paid or unpaid medical leave if either 
managerial and/or nonmanagerial employees had access to leave in 
Table 7. In a small percentage of cases, managers had access to leave, 
while nonmanagers did not (or the converse). Hence, the exact per 
centages reporting leave may vary slightly across the equations. The 
unpaid medical leave variable used in Table 7 refers to formal unpaid 
leave plans, while Tables 9-12 classify a firm's unpaid leave policy 
into three categories of unpaid leave: formal leave with a job guaran 
tee, leave with no guarantee (including informal plans and formal plans 
without job guarantees), and no unpaid leave.
The major issue in examining Tables 9-12 centers on determining 
when a variable operates differently in its effect on whether a leave is 
provided with or without the benefit continuation or a job guarantee. 
The most potentially interesting cases are 1) those in which the vari 
able's coefficient achieves statistical significance for one of the options 
but not the other, and 2) those in which the variable's coefficient 
achieves significance for the two options, but the effect is different in 
magnitude or operates in a different direction or both. In this set of 
four equations, there is no instance in which a variable significantly 
affects health benefit continuation and job guarantees and where these 
effects are statistically significant and in different directions.
Health Benefit Continuation. The only significant economies of 
scale of group purchase effects occur in firms employing more than 15 
workers (Tables 9 and 10). Firms in the smallest employment size cat 
egory provide significantly fewer paid leaves with and without benefit 
continuation for managers and nonmanagers. They also provide sig 
nificantly fewer unpaid leaves with benefit continuation for managers
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and nonmanagers than do firms with more than 100 employees. These 
effects are generally small, as shown by the OLS equivalent coeffi 
cients, which indicate that a 10 percent increase in the independent 
variable will result in about a 1 percent increase in the probability that 
a firm will provide paid medical leave (with or without benefit continu 
ation).
Other measurers of firm size have significant coefficients in the 
paid medical leave (managers and nonmanagers) equations. Firms 
with less than $50 million in sales provide significantly fewer paid 
medical leaves for managers and nonmanagers than do other firms. The 
only similar scale effects for unpaid medical leave occur for nonman 
agers' unpaid medical leave without benefit continuation for workers 
in firms with annual sales volumes of less than $250,000, with signifi 
cantly fewer firms providing such leaves.
Sole proprietorships offer significantly fewer formal unpaid medi 
cal leaves for managers (not surprisingly, since the proprietor is often 
the only manager in a sole proprietorship). The likelihood of firms in 
industries with a higher percentage of businesses employing fewer than 
100 workers providing paid medical leaves (with or without benefit 
continuation) for either managers or nonmanagers is significantly 
lower than for firms in industries where the percentage of small firms 
in those industries is higher. The OLS equivalent coefficients show 
that the effect of the sole proprietorship form of business organization 
on the provision of paid leave with and without benefit continuation is 
small.
Tables 9 and 10 show few industry effects on leave for managers 
and nonmanagers. There is only a significantly negative coefficient on 
the retail trade dummy variable, indicating that firms in retail trade pro 
vide significantly fewer paid medical leaves (with or without benefit 
continuation) for either managers or nonmanagers than do firms in ser 
vices. In the case of paid leaves (with or without benefit continuation), 
firms in agriculture, mining, and construction are significantly less 
likely to provide such leave than are service sector firms.
Other variables that significantly affect the provision of paid and 
unpaid medical leave are the percentage of female managers in a firm, 
which positively affects the likelihood that a firm will provide both 
types of medical leave for managers and nonmanagers with or without 
benefit continuation. Across the board, the higher the percentage of
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Table 9 Multinomial Logit Estimates of the Probability that a Firm 
Provides Paid and Unpaid Medical Leave With and Without 
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Paid medical leave Unpaid medical leave
Variable13
Without




continuation and formal plan
Percent age 55 or more,
Managers
Percent age 55 or more,
Nonmanagers
State unemployment rate






































a Original logit coefficient in brackets and standard error of original logit coefficient in 
parentheses.
b Excluded categories of categorical variables include' 100 or more employees, sales vol 
ume greater than $50 million annually, Subchapter S Corporations (ownership type), ser 
vices (industry), and nonunion workers.
***significant at the 1% level (two-tailed test).
**significant at the 5% level (two-tailed test).
*significant at the 10% level (two-tailed test)
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Table 10 Multinomial Logit Estimates of the Probability that a Firm 
Provides Paid and Unpaid Medical Leave with and without 
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Table 10 (continued)
Variable13
Percent female in industry
Percent age 55 or more,
Managers
Percent age 55 or more,
Nonmanagers
State unemployment rate





















































a Original logit coefficient in brackets and standard error of original logit coefficient in
parentheses. 
b Excluded categories of categorical variables include: 100 or more employees, sales
volume greater than $50 million annually, Subchapter S Corporations (ownership
type), services (industry), and nonunion workers. 
***significant at the 1% level (two-tailed test).
**significant at the 5% level (two-tailed test).
*significant at the 10% level (two-tailed test)
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Table 11 Multinomial Logit Estimates of the Probability that a Firm Provides 
Paid and Unpaid Medical Leave with and without Job Guarantee, for 
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Variable15
Percent female in industry
Percent age 55 or more,
Managers
Percent age 55 or more,
Nonmanagers
State unemployment rate



















































a Original logit coefficient in brackets and standard error of original logit coefficient in
parentheses. 
b Excluded categories of categorical variables include: 100 or more employees, sales
volume greater than $50 million annually, Subchapter S Corporations (ownership
type), services (industry), and nonunion workers. 
***significant at the 1% level (two-tailed test).
**significant at the 5% level (two-tailed test). 
*significant at the 10% level (two-tailed test).
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Table 12 Multinomial Logit Estimates of the Probability that a Firm
Provides Paid and Unpaid Medical Leave with and without Job 
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Paid medical leave
Variable6











Percent female age 16-44,
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a Original logit coefficient in brackets and standard error of original logit coefficient in 
parentheses.
b Excluded categories of categorical variables include: 100 or more employees, sales vol 
ume greater than $50 million annually, Subchapter S Corporations (ownership type), ser 
vices (industry), and nonunion workers
***significant at the 1% level (two-tailed test). 
**significant at the 5% level (two-tailed test). 
* significant at the 10% level (two-tailed test).
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women nonmanagers or the larger the percentage of managers aged 55 
or more in a firm, the more likely a firm will provide paid or unpaid 
medical leave (with or without benefit continuation).
The higher percentage of female managers (aged 16-44) in a firm, 
the more likely that firm will provide unpaid medical leave without 
benefit continuation for both managers and nonmanagers. The per 
centage of women in the industry has significant negative impacts on 
the likelihood that a firm will provide either paid or unpaid medical 
leave to its workers with benefit continuation to its workers.
Finally, the higher the unemployment rate in the state in which the 
firm does business, the less likely it will be to provide paid or unpaid 
medical leave with benefit continuation. The effect of the unemploy 
ment rate on the likelihood that a firm provides paid medical leave with 
benefit continuation is relatively large according to the OLS equivalent 
coefficients—a 1 percent increase in the state unemployment rate vari 
able results in a lowering of the probability that a firm will provide paid 
medical leave for its managers or nonmanagers by more than 2 percent. 
The larger the percentage of a state's population that resides in rural 
areas, the less likely a firm will be to provide paid or unpaid medical 
leave without benefit continuation. Again the OLS equivalent coeffi 
cients indicate that these effects are relatively small.
The story here appears to be that, for paid leave, the reduced form 
demand model fits the data well. Thus, in the paid medical leave with 
benefit and without benefit guarantee equations for managers, the chi- 
square statistics are 513 for managers and 485 for nonmanagers and 25 
coefficients attain statistical significance. In the unpaid medical leave 
equations for managers and nonmanagers, however, the chi-square sta 
tistics are only 164 and 141, respectively, and only six coefficients 
attain significance at conventional levels. The latter chi-square statistic 
(for nonmanagers) is not significant at the 10 percent level. Thus, the 
model performs much better in describing the provision of paid rather 
than unpaid leave. We speculate that the reason for this superior per 
formance is that unpaid leave is a benefit that whose value is difficult 
for both employers (suppliers) and employees (demanders) to assess 
and therefore the "market" for such leave does not fulfill the assump 
tions necessary for the existence of a well functioning market and a 
model of behavior that assumes the existence of such conditions will 
not perform well in describing behavior.
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Job Guarantees. The overall pattern of relationships observed in 
Tables 9 and 10 for health benefit continuation are also observed in 
Tables 11 and 12, which provide the multinomial logit estimates that 
differentiate between the three choices: no leave, leave without a job 
guarantee, and leave with a job guarantee. This section will focus on 
the small number of variables where differences do occur.
The most noticeable difference in the set firm size variables occurs 
for unpaid leave without a job guarantee in terms of the effects of the 
variables for 16^-9 and 50-99 workers. The results suggest that such 
firms are significantly more likely than firms employing 100 or more 
workers to provide the option of leave without a job guarantee for both 
managers and nonmanagers. It may be that the costs of such an option 
are lower in midsize firms than in larger or smaller firms. Simply put, 
smaller and larger firms might be required to formally replace the 
leave-taker for different reasons. This is necessitated because there is 
no one available to do the leave-takers work in smaller firms, and jobs 
in larger firms are so specialized that such a replacement is required. It 
is only in medium-sized firms where there are enough other workers to 
"cover for" the absent worker and full job specialization has not 
become so pronounced as to make substitutions within the firm's own 
workforce possible. This is consistent with Trzcinski and Alpert 
(1990), in which they found that large firms were more likely than 
small ones to use formal temporary workers.
The second difference occurs in the effects of demographic vari 
ables. In the job guarantee equations, as the percent female of the 
firm's managerial workforce increases, the likelihood also increases of 
leave with a job guarantee relative to the other two options. The per 
cent female of the firm's nonmanagerial workforce has significant 
effects for the two categories of leave with and without a job guarantee, 
but the magnitude of the coefficient is larger for the category, leave 
with no guarantee. This pattern is also observed for the percent of the 
firm's managerial workforce, aged 55 or older. The third and final dif 
ference occurs in the effects of the percent female in the industry vari 
able. In the job guarantee equations, the variable's coefficient is 
significant and negative for leave with and without a job guarantee, 
with the absolute magnitude greater in the case of leave with no guar 
antee.
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Summary
Overall, the variables included in the models tend to predict the 
provision or nonprovision of leave better than they predict the provi 
sion or nonprovision of health benefit continuation or job guarantees. 
What is particularly striking in comparing the results in Table 7 with 
the set of results in Tables 9-12 are the effects of the firm-specific 
demand-side variables. Although Table 7 suggests that unionized firms 
are no more likely than nonunionized firms to provide paid sick leave, 
Tables 9-12 indicate that unionized firms are more likely to provide 
health benefit continuation and job guarantees than are other firms. In 
Table 7, the significant effects of demographic variables are all consis 
tent with the predictions of the model in terms of their effects on influ 
encing the incidence of leave. In the conditions of leave equations, 
however, these variables either did not predict whether leave was pro 
vided with or without health benefit continuation or job guarantees, or 
they tended to have signs that were inconsistent with our expectations. 
As an additional caveat, the reader should bear in mind that several of 
the variables may be acting as proxy variables for income and, hence, 
their coefficients may be biased.
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This chapter explored two aspects of family and medical leave 
with the basic premise that family and medical leave consists of two 
separable analytical components—a wage replacement component and 
a job guarantee component. We found that these components are dealt 
with separately in both Canada and the United States. We examined 
the incidence of leave to verify our hypothesis for both countries. We 
further investigated the correlates of two types of family and medical 
leave for two types of family and medical leave provision in the United 
States.
The central hypothesis is that the factors determining the provision 
of wage replacement during leave differ from the determinants of 
whether or not a job guarantee is provided. In general, this hypothesis 
implies that differences exist in the factors that determine the provision
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of paid versus unpaid leave. Specifically, it is hypothesized that the 
determinants of paid leave are similar to those which account for other 
fringe benefits. It is further hypothesized that the provision of unpaid 
leave will not be as fully explained by the standard reduced form 
demand models specifying fringe benefit determination as will the pro 
vision of paid leave.
Our findings indicate that the standard reduced form demand 
model provides a strong basis from which to predict the provision of 
paid leave, but it is considerably weaker in explaining the incidence of 
unpaid leave and conditions surrounding leave. Our findings thus sug 
gest that different theoretical approaches need to be developed if we 
are to understand the provision of unpaid leave with job guarantees in 
the private sector and if we are to analyze actual effects of exiting leg 
islation and potential effects of future legislative initiates.
Note
1. The clawback operates as follows: 
Net income = $80,000 
UI clawback level $58,110 
Difference $21,890 
30% of difference $6,657 
UI benefits $6,375 
30% of benefits $1,913 
Amount to be repaid to UI $1,913 
(UI clawback is the lesser of $1,913 and $6,657)
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